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For a developing economy with a given urban wage rate, globalization in
capital markets strengthens labor unions. This result hinges on the ﬁxed
urban wage rate, which leads to a constant capital–labor ratio in the
urban sector. Globalization via capital inﬂows not only enhances the
employment eﬀect of unionization but also reduces the rent-shifting
related loss in production ineﬃciency to domestic capital, lending a
support to labor unions for developing economies. This result is contrary
to the common belief that labor unions tend to be weakened during the
globalization process observed after 1980s in many developed economies.
Keywords: unionization; globalization; capital inﬂow
JEL Classiﬁcations: F20 J50
1. Introduction
The declines in labor unionization since the early 1980s have been well
documented in many advanced industrial economies. For instance, from
1980 to 1992, union density fell from 24.4% to 15.3% in the US, 56.3% to
41.3% in the UK, 52.4% to 39.6% in Australia, and 31.2% to 24.5% in
Japan (Wallerstein and Western 2000). Changes in labor force and labor
demand may contribute this phenomenon. In particular, studies ﬁnd that
globalization through competition in domestic and international goods and
factor markets aﬀects labor demand, thereby yielding a downward pressure
on unions in developed economies. As shown by Magnani and Prentice
(2003), globalization reduces union density from 38.9% to 18.2% over the
period of 1973–1994 in the US manufacturing. Similar evidences have also
been conﬁrmed in other economies, such as Belgium (Abraham, Konings,
and Vanormelingen 2009).1 Regardless of these trends, the political and
economic roles of labour unions in developed countries such as the United
States remain crucial, as evidenced by the current focus on public unions in
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and Vanormelingen 2009).1 Regardless of these trends, the political and
economic roles of labour unions in developed countries such as the United
States remain crucial, as evidenced by the current focus on public unions in
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Wisconsin during a tight budgetary cycle, and by the key role of unions in
the ﬁnancial restructuring plans in the automobile industry.
Nevertheless, in developing countries, because employers are strong, union
power is relatively weak and union density is substantially lower. For example,
as Kim (2005) points out, the unionization rate on average is 6% only in South
Korea over last three decades but it rose from 4% in 1970 to 7% in 2002. An
interesting question arisen is thus: Does globalization via capital markets
weaken the already weakened labor unions in developing economies?
This article investigates that question from a theoretical perspective. We
adopt the dualistic production structure of Harris and Todaro (1970) to
depict uneven development in a developing economy. Due to an
institutionally set urban wage rate, the economy experiences urban
unemployment. We deviate from their model by introducing labor unions
in the urban sector. These unions bargain with ﬁrms in pursuit of
employment. The unions desire that workers are hired based on their
average product, whereas the ﬁrms consider only the marginal product of
labor. This divergence shifts part of capital rents to urban workers, leading
to a production ineﬃciency that hampers economic welfare. Nevertheless,
given the ﬁxed urban wage rate, unions bargain for greater employment,
which lowers the urban unemployment rate. The employment-enhancing
eﬀect supports the unionization of labor in developing economies. This
employment eﬀect can be further enhanced through inﬂows of foreign
capital that raise production and employment in the urban manufacturing
sector. In addition, the rent-shifting related eﬃciency loss can be partly
shared by foreign capitalists. Thus, globalization via capital markets
strengthens, rather than weakens, labor unions in developing economies.
It is worth noting that the welfare issue of capital inﬂows in the trade
literature has been well studied. As shown in Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro
(1977), inﬂows of foreign capital to the protected importable sector are
unambiguously welfare reducing for an economy with full employment,
since increased capital ampliﬁes the sector that has less comparative
advantage in production. However, in the presence of sectoral unemploy-
ment in the Harris–Todaro model, the induced employment eﬀect by foreign
capital can have a powerful beneﬁt to the economy (Khan 1982; Grinols
1991). Following the same line, the beneﬁcial employment eﬀect derived in
this article can mitigate the eﬃciency loss from unionization.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
dualistic model of a developing economy in which unionized manufacturing
ﬁrms operate in the urban sector and non-unionized agricultural ﬁrms
operate in the rural sector. Using this production structure, a two-stage
game is considered: the amount of foreign capital is set in the ﬁrst stage and
the optimal degree of urban unionization is determined in the second stage.
We then investigate the impact of the globalization via capital markets on
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2. The model and analysis
Consider a developing economy in which the salient feature is a dualistic
structure comprising an urban and a rural sector. Manufacturing ﬁrms in
the urban sector produce good X and the rural sector produces agricultural
good Y. Choosing good Y as the numeraire, the relative price of good X is
denoted by p which is given by the small-country assumption. Taking labor
(Li), capital (K), and land (T) into account, the respective production
functions are X ¼ X(LX, K) and Y ¼ Y(LY, T).2 Both production tech-
nologies are under constant returns to scale with positive and diminishing
marginal products, i.e. XL 4 0 and XLL 5 0, etc. It is noted that the stock
of total capital, consisting of domestic and foreign capital, K ¼ Kd þ Kf, is
an exogenous variable.
Following the model of a dualistic developing economy developed by
Harris and Todaro (1970), urban wage wX is institutionally set above the
market-clearing rate and the rural wage rate is ﬂexible.3 This leads to labor
migration from rural to urban area, resulting in urban unemployment Lu.
Urban workers form a labor union to negotiate with manufacturing ﬁrms on
the level of employment LX. The Nash bargaining problem is: Max
(wXLX)
a[pX(LX, K)7wXLX]
(17a) over LX, where a reﬂects the union’s
bargaining power. The level of urban employment LX can be implicitly
solved from the ﬁrst-order condition, as follows:
wX ¼ apX LX;Kð Þ=LX þ ð1� aÞpXL LX;Kð Þ ð1Þ
The union tends to use the value of average product of labor for
bargaining over the level of hiring, whereas the ﬁrms only consider the
marginal product of labor. Utilizing the homogenous property, (1) can be re-
written as: wX ¼ pXL þ apXKK/LX. In the absence of the labor union
(a ¼ 0), workers receive the competitive wage rate purely based on the value
marginal product. However, in the presence of the union, the a portion of
the capital rents is shifted to the workers. When a ¼ 1, the workers receive all
of the income from production because they have 100% bargaining power.
Consequently, unionization leads to production ineﬃciency via the rent-
shifting eﬀect, as measured by the diﬀerence between the wage rate and the
value marginal product of labor: wX7pXL ¼ a p(X/LX7XL) 4 0.
In the competitive market, once urban employment has been determined,
capital owners receive the remaining income from production rK ¼ pX(LX,
K)7wXLX, where r denotes the rate of return on capital. This gives:
r ¼ ð1� aÞpXK LX;Kð Þ ð2Þ
which shows that the rate of return on capital is below its value marginal
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In the competitive market, once urban employment has been determined,
capital owners receive the remaining income from production rK ¼ pX(LX,
K)7wXLX, where r denotes the rate of return on capital. This gives:
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which shows that the rate of return on capital is below its value marginal
product when 0 5 a 51. The labor union is thus able to inﬂuence the
distribution of income to the beneﬁt of urban workers but at the expense of
capitalists.
Consider next the markets for labor and land in the rural sector.
Assuming that the rural markets are non-unionized and competitive, the
factor returns are determined by their value marginal products: wY ¼
YL(LY, T) and v ¼ YT(LY, T), where wY and v are, respectively, the rural
wage rate and the land rent.
It is assumed that workers are perfectly mobile between the rural and
urban sectors of the economy. Following Harris and Todaro (1970),
rural–urban migration stops when the expected urban wage equals the
rural wage rate:
wX=ð1þ mÞ ¼ YL LY;Tð Þ ð3Þ
where m ¼ Lu/LX is the urban unemployment ratio.4 Letting L be the
endowment of labor in the economy, the employment condition of the labor
market satisﬁes
ð1þ mÞLX þ LY ¼ L ð4Þ
Equations (1)–(4) describe the production structure of the dualistic
developing economy. We solve the model backward. Given an amount of
foreign capital, we examine ﬁrst the eﬀects of labor unionization on sectoral
allocation of labor and urban unemployment. In the urban sector, as
indicated in (1), the given wage rate wX exceeds the value marginal product
of labor by apXKK/LX. This suggests that a rise in the union’s bargaining
power a increases urban employment because it can be considered
equivalent to a reduction in the value marginal productivity of labor.5 By
solving (1), the urban employment eﬀect of unionization can be expressed as
dLX=da ¼ XK=½a XK=LXð Þ þ ð1� aÞXLK� > 0 ð5Þ
Consequently, increased employment in the urban sector takes more
rents out from capitalists. This causes a fall in the rate of return on capital
by (2):
dr=da ¼ �ap XK=LXð ÞðdLX=daÞ < 0 ð6Þ
It is noted that the rise in urban employment comes from the pool of rural
workers and unemployed urban workers. Thus, solving (3) and (4) yields
dLY=da ¼ �fð1þ mÞYL=½YL � ð1þ mÞLXYLL�gðdLX=daÞ < 0 ð7Þ
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Furthermore, a rise in urban unionization increases the rural wage rate:
dwY=da ¼ �½wY=ð1þ mÞ�ðdm=daÞ > 0 ð9Þ
This can be seen from (7) that the rise in urban unionization leads to a
decline in rural employment, which then raises the value marginal
productivity of labor in the agricultural sector.
Turning next to the demand side of the economy, domestic consumers
demand for both manufactured and agricultural goods (denoted by DX and
DY) and their expenditure function is: E(p, u) ¼ min{pDX þ DY: u(DX,
DY) ¼ u}, where u is the level of utility and preferences are assumed to be
homothetic.6 Applying the envelop properties, the compensated demand for
good X is Ep ¼ DX and the inverse of marginal utility of income is Eu 4 0.
The budget constraint on the economy requires the equality of expenditure
and net income from production of two goods out of the payments to
foreign capital:
E p; uð Þ ¼ pXþ Y� rKf ð10Þ
For a given amount of the capital stock K, a change in welfare is
obtained by totally diﬀerentiating (1), (4), and (10) and then combining
them:
Eudu ¼ �wYLXdm� wX � pXLð ÞdLX � Kfdr ð11Þ
Equation (11) indicates that two distortions, urban unemployment and
union power, together with changes in payments to foreign capital, aﬀect the
welfare of the economy. The welfare eﬀect of an increase in union strength is
thus given by
Euðdu=daÞ ¼ �wYLXðdm=daÞ � wX � pXLð ÞðdLX=daÞ � Kfðdr=daÞ ð12Þ
It is noted that the ﬁrst term in (12) represents the value eﬀect of
unionization on total employment, since 7wYLX(dm/da) ¼ wX(dLX/da) þ
wY(dLY/da) by (4). As dm/da 5 0 according to (8), a rise in union power has
a favorable eﬀect on total employment by lowering the urban unemploy-
ment ratio. However, as expressed in the second term in (12), unionization
distorts the labor market by paying urban workers more than the value of
marginal product of labor, i.e. wX7pXL ¼ apXKK/LX 4 0. This rent-
shifting eﬀect results in a production ineﬃciency that decreases welfare.
The loss constitutes a burden to capitalists. Nonetheless, the burden is
partly shared by foreign capital since dr/da ¼ 7a(pXK/LX)(dLX/da) 5 0
given in (6). By combining the last two terms in (12), the eﬃciency loss of
unionization to domestic capital becomes (apXKKd/LX)(dLX/da).
The conﬂicting forces in (12) make the welfare eﬀect of unionization
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wY(dLY/da) by (4). As dm/da 5 0 according to (8), a rise in union power has
a favorable eﬀect on total employment by lowering the urban unemploy-
ment ratio. However, as expressed in the second term in (12), unionization
distorts the labor market by paying urban workers more than the value of
marginal product of labor, i.e. wX7pXL ¼ apXKK/LX 4 0. This rent-
shifting eﬀect results in a production ineﬃciency that decreases welfare.
The loss constitutes a burden to capitalists. Nonetheless, the burden is
partly shared by foreign capital since dr/da ¼ 7a(pXK/LX)(dLX/da) 5 0
given in (6). By combining the last two terms in (12), the eﬃciency loss of
unionization to domestic capital becomes (apXKKd/LX)(dLX/da).
The conﬂicting forces in (12) make the welfare eﬀect of unionization
ambiguous. Substituting (5), (6), and (8) into (12), the welfare eﬀect of
unionization can be expressed in terms of the employment eﬀect and the
eﬃciency loss to domestic capital:
Euðdu=daÞ ¼ ðbwXLX � apXKKdÞ 1=LXð ÞðdLX=daÞ; ð13Þ
where b ¼ 1/[1 þeLLY/(1 þ m)LX] and in which eL ¼ 7YL/LYYLL is
the elasticity of demand for labor in the rural sector. Letting
Ua ¼ bwXLX 7 apXKKd, the optimal degree of union strength, a8, repre-
sented by its bargaining power, can be thus solved by setting du/da ¼ 0 (i.e.
Ua ¼ 0) in (13). Since dLX/da 4 0 by (5), we have
ao ¼ bwXLX=pXKKd ð14Þ
At a8, social welfare is maximized.7 This can be veriﬁed by checking the
curvature of the utility function. Following Neary (1993), substituting (14)
into (13), the change in welfare can be expressed as
Euðdu=daÞ ¼ � pXKKd=LXð ÞðdLX=daÞða� aoÞ ð15Þ
Since dLX/da 4 0, an increase (a reduction) in a raises welfare when
a 5 (4) a8. Thus, changes in a toward a8 improve welfare, and the welfare
reaches maximum when the level of union power is at the value of a8.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of globalization via inﬂows of foreign
capital on the optimal strength of the union. To do this, we need to solve the
eﬀects of an increase in foreign capital on sectoral allocation of labor and its
income distribution. Utilizing (1), the impact of capital inﬂows on the level
of urban employment can be obtained as
dLX=dK ¼ LX=K > 0 ð16Þ
Under the ﬁxed urban wage rate in the Harris–Todaro model, labor and
capital must increase at the same proportion. This implies that the rate of
return on capital should remain unchanged:
dr=dK ¼ 0 ð17Þ
Similar to the labor allocational eﬀect of unionization, a rise in foreign
capital attracts more workers to the urban sector. This lowers employment
in the rural sector and also reduces unemployment in the urban sector:
dLY=dK ¼ �fð1þ mÞYL=½YL � ð1þ mÞLXYLL�g dLX=dKð Þ < 0 ð18Þ
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Accordingly, from (3), a rise in foreign capital increases the rural
wage rate:
dwY=dK ¼ �½wY=ð1þ mÞ�ðdm=dKÞ > 0 ð20Þ
We are now ready to examine the eﬀect of globalization via capital
inﬂows on the optimal level of urban union power. By totally diﬀerentiating
the ﬁrst-order condition, Ua ¼ 0, in (13) with respect to a and K and then
collecting the terms, we have:8
dao=dK ¼ �½wXLXðdb=dKÞ þ bwX dLX=dKð Þ�=Uaa ð21Þ
where db/dK ¼7{eLL/[(1 þ m)LX þ eLLY]2}(dLY/dK) 4 0 and Uaa 5 0 by
the second-order condition of welfare maximization.9 This ensures that
da8/dK 4 0 in (21). Thus, globalization strengthens union’s bargaining
power in a developing economy. This result is illustrated in Figure 1, in
which the degree of unionization is depicted in the horizontal axis. For
a given amount of capital stock K, the UU schedule depicts the welfare
proﬁle of unionization. Starting with a ¼ 0, an introduction of a labor
union increases labor employment, thereby raising social welfare by (13).
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Figure 1. Welfare proﬁles of unionization.
However, when the degree of union power becomes large, the loss from
production ineﬃciency to domestic capital begins to pull welfare down.
Welfare is thus maximized at the level of unionization a8. When more
foreign capital ﬂows into the economy, the welfare proﬁle of unionization
shifts up to the U0U0 schedule as the rise in foreign capital not only enhances
employment in the economy indicated in the ﬁrst term in (21) but also
reduces the eﬃciency loss to domestic capital captured by the second term in
(21). The new welfare proﬁle thus raises the optimal level of union power
to a88 in Figure 1. These results can be summarized, as follows:
Proposition: In a dualistic developing economy with a given urban wage
rate, globalization via inﬂows of foreign capital should increase the optimal
degree of labor unionization in the urban sector.
3. Conclusions
Using a dualistic production structure with a given urban wage rate, we
show that globalization via capital markets can strengthen labor unions in a
developing economy. This result hinges on the ﬁxed urban wage rate
assumed in the Harris–Todaro (1970) model, which leads to a constant
capital–labor ratio in the urban sector. Globalization through capital
inﬂows not only enhances the employment eﬀect of unionization but also
reduces the rent-shifting related loss in production ineﬃciency to domestic
capital, lending a positive support to labor unions in developing economies.
This result is contrary to the common belief that labor unions tend to be
weakened during the globalization process observed after 1980s in many
advanced industrial economies.
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Notes
1. The determinants of unionization can be found in Katz (1993) and Bender
(1997). A reverse view is that aggressive labor unions can be an obstacle to the
integration of capital markets in industrialized countries (Aloi, Leite-Monteiro,
and Loyd-Braga 2009). Kemp and Shimomura (1985) nevertheless show that the
emergence of labor unions can actually attract, rather than drive out, foreign
capital. Thus, the causality between globalization and unionization should be an
interesting topic for investigation.
2. This three-factor model on production is originated from Jones (1971). See
Chakrabarti (2009), Gilbert and Oladi (2009), Beladi and Marjit (1996), Beladi,
Chakrabarti, and Marjit (2010), Beladi and Yabuuchi (2010) and Hadjiyiannis,
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3. The speciﬁc-factor Harris and Todaro (1970) model was extended by Corden
and Findlay (1975) and Neary (1981) to consider intersectoral mobility of
capital. Other studies can be found, for example, in Parai and Beladi (1997), and
Hatzipanayotou and Michael (2001).
4. The urban unemployment rate is r ¼ Lu/(LX þ Lu), which can be written as:
r ¼ m/(1 þ m), where m (¼ Lu/LX) is the urban unemployment ratio. There is a
strictly positive relation between m and r because dr/dm ¼ 1/(1 þ m)2 4 0.
5. We acknowledge a referee for pointing out this interpretation.
6. Under homothetic preferences, a representative consumer exists and its demand
can represent aggregate demand of the economy.
7. This idea size of bargaining power is from social point of view, rather than from
the union’s perspective. However, under the latter case, the optimal value
of a would be unity because all of the capital income is shifted to urban workers.
We thank for a referee to mention this implication.
8. We use dXK/dK ¼ XKL(dLX/dK) þ XKK ¼ (XKLLX þ XKKK)/K ¼ 0 to obtain
this result, since the production function of good X is homogenous of degree one
in labor and capital.
9. Diﬀerentiating Ua with respect to a gives: Uaa ¼7pKdXK7apKdXKL(dLX/da) þ
wXLX(db/da) þ bwX(dLX/da), where db/da ¼7{eLL/[(1 þ m)LX þ eLLY]2}6
(dLY/da) 4 0.
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